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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On March 15, 2019, Brenton Tarrant, a twenty-eight-year-old 
white male, posted a livestream video on Facebook just moments 
before opening fire on members of the Al Noor Mosque in 
Christchurch, New Zealand.1  Tarrant took the lives of forty-one 
individuals before proceeding to the Linwood Islamic Centre to carry 
out his violent plan to kill Muslims.2  Fifty-one lives were lost that 
day at the hands of a terrorist in the name of white supremacy.3  In 
addition to broadcasting his attack worldwide, Tarrant posted a 
sixteen-thousand-word manifesto to a popular hate-filled forum—
8chan.4  Tarrant exploited various avenues of social media to draw 
attention to his cause, which played out exactly as he had hoped.5  
The terrorist attack in New Zealand sparked a series of attacks in the 
U.S. in the name of white supremacy;6 the deadliest was the shooting 
in El Paso, Texas.7  On August 3, 2019, Patrick Crusius, a twenty-
one-year-old white male, opened fire at a Walmart shopping center in 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, May 2021, University of Baltimore School of Law, Business Law 
Concentration; B.A., Political Science, Philosophy, May 2017, University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte.  I would like to thank Professor Colin Starger for his support 
and guidance throughout the research process.  A special thank you to the University 
of Baltimore Law Review staff for their hard work and dedication to this Issue. 
1.  Christchurch Shooting Live Updates: 49 Are Dead After 2 Mosques Are Hit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/world/asia/new-zeala 
nd-shooting-updates-christchurch.html [https://perma.cc/FY3J-923N] [hereinafter 
Christchurch Shooting]. 
2.  See SOUFAN CTR., WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RISE OF THE 
VIOLENT WHITE SUPREMACIST MOVEMENT 6 (2019), https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Report-by-The-Soufan-Center-White-Supremacy-Extremism 
-The-Transnational-Rise-of-The-Violent-White-Supremacist-Movement.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/H5AG-7D7M]; see also Christchurch Shooting, supra note 1. 
3.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 26. 
4.  Taylor Lorenz, The Shooter’s Manifesto Was Designed to Troll, ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/the-shooters-manifes 
to-was-designed-to-troll/585058/ [https://perma.cc/S2CZ-D4H4].   
5.  See infra Section II.B. 
6.  See Tim Arango et al., Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto 
Appears Online, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/BT6 
K-E2FN] (“Christchurch has become a rallying cry for extremists the world over.”); 
see also SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 18. 
7.  Mass Shooting in El Paso: What We Know, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Aug. 4, 
2019), https://www.adl.org/blog/mass-shooting-in-el-paso-what-we-know [https://per 
ma.cc/TP7X-LQAP] [hereinafter Mass Shooting in El Paso] (“This makes the El Paso 
shooting the deadliest white supremacist attack in the U.S. in more than 50 years[.]”).  
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El Paso, Texas.8  This attack claimed the lives of twenty-two 
individuals, left twenty-six wounded, and forced countless others to 
bear witness to yet another violent act committed because of racial 
animus.9  These were not random acts of violence by disturbed 
individuals; they were calculated acts of terrorism.10 
 Prior to the El Paso attack, Crusius posted a manifesto to the online 
forum, 8chan, where like-minded individuals go to share and 
promote extreme right wing ideologies.11  This platform not only 
hosted Crusius’s manifesto, but was also the source of his 
radicalization, taking the process full circle.12  Dissemination of 
violent extremist ideas on unmoderated online forums has fostered a 
movement of self-radicalization, resulting in a number of mass 
shootings across the U.S.13  Current legislation makes it nearly 
impossible for the Government to control what is posted and shared 
online;14 however, at the request of policymakers and the public, a 
 
8.  Vanessa Romo, El Paso Walmart Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, NPR (Oct. 10, 
2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769013051/el-paso-walmart-shoot 
ing-suspect-pleads-not-guilty [https://perma.cc/N7MC-Q9SG]. 
9.  See id. 
10.  Compare Sam Levin, ‘It’s a Small Group of People’: Trump Again Denies White 
Nationalism Is Rising Threat, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2019, 8:53 PM), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/15/donald-trump-denies-white-nationalism-
threat-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/BY9Y-7XJR] (quoting President Trump who, 
when asked whether he believed white nationalism is on its way to becoming an 
increasingly large threat, characterized the problem as “a small group of people that 
have very, very serious problems.”), with SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 8 (“[W]hite 
supremacist extremists . . . pose a clear terrorist threat to the United States.”). 
11.  See Mass Shooting in El Paso, supra note 7; see also Patrick Lucas Austin, What Is 
8chan, and How Is it Related to this Weekend’s Shootings? Here’s What to Know, 
TIME (Aug. 5, 2019, 2:28 PM), https://time.com/5644314/8chan-shootings/ [https:// 
perma.cc/RZ3T-KAVA]. 
12.  See Drew Harwell, Three Mass Shootings This Year Began with a Hateful Screed on 
8chan. Its Founder Calls It a Terrorist Refuge in Plain Sight., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 
2019, 9:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/04/three-mass 
-shootings-this-year-began-with-hateful-screed-chan-its-founder-calls-it-terrorist-
refuge-plain-sight/ [https://perma.cc/795P-8GS2]. 
13.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6; see also U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, PREVENTING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PROMOTING INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT, TOLERANCE 
AND RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY 12 (2016), https://www.undp.org/content/dam/ 
norway/undp-ogc/documents/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent% 
20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3L88-LSNK] (“The killing of 77 young people in Norway in 2011 and the 
murder of nine worshippers at a church in South Carolina in 2015 both originated 
from the same hate-filled ideology.”).  
14.  See Steven Beale, Comment, Online Terrorist Speech, Direct Government 
Regulation, and the Communications Decency Act, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 333, 
334–35 (2018). 
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select few online service providers are attempting to curb the spread 
of violent extremism through moderation of social media platforms.15  
While these efforts are well-intentioned, the violent acts seen across 
the nation in recent years have risen to the level of terrorism and 
should be treated as such.16  White supremacist extremism poses a 
complex transnational problem, and the threat requires a composite 
solution.17  Current terrorism legislation needs to be reformed, and 
tools that have proven effective in fighting foreign terrorist threats 
must be implemented on the domestic stage.18 
Part II of this Comment describes the largest threat of violence 
facing the U.S.—domestic terrorism—and explores how the free flow 
of hate-speech and violent content online has created a global 
problem.19  Part III highlights some of the limitations government 
agencies are facing under current U.S. terrorism law in their attempt 
to thwart acts of domestic terrorism and reprimand individuals whose 
heinous crimes rise to the level of terrorism.20  Part IV explores 
crucial avenues to equip government entities with the appropriate 
resources to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur and to 
adequately punish those who manage to go undetected and carry such 
plans to completion.21  Part V concludes by summarizing the next 
steps that must be taken by policymakers if the Government hopes to 
attain the same level of success it has achieved in containing foreign 
threats.22 
II. THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM 
A. The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism 
The word “terrorism” has been closely associated with foreign 
threats.23  This is due to the lasting impact and high-level of media 
coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the threat of ISIS in 
 
15.  See Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-free-
speech-popular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/LD74-BHUK]. 
16.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 8 (“From Pittsburgh to Poway and Charleston to El 
Paso, white supremacist extremists (WSEs) pose a clear terrorist threat to the United 
States.”). 
17.  See id. at 6–7. 
18.  See infra Part IV. 
19.  See infra Part II. 
20.  See infra Part III. 
21.  See infra Par IV. 
22.  See infra Part V. 
23.  SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 41. 
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more recent years.24  While jihadist groups and other foreign terrorist 
entities remain a threat, domestic terrorism committed by extreme 
right groups has proven much more lethal in recent years.25  
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), a prominent anti-
hate organization, the term “extreme right” refers to “the white 
supremacist movement, including its various sub[-]movements, such 
as neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, and the alt right, among others.”26  
Extreme right, “far-right extremism,” and “white supremacy 
extremism” are terms often used interchangeably to describe various 
extremist ideologies and racial theories with foundations that stem 
from the idea of white supremacy.27  A 2017 study conducted by the 
ADL shows that between September 12, 2001 and December 31, 
2016, far-right extremists were responsible for seventy-three percent 
of all violent extremist attacks in the U.S., compared to the twenty-
seven percent credited to radical Islamist violence.28  In 2018, the 
ADL conducted another study which showed that domestic Islamic 
extremists were responsible for only two percent of the total number 
of extremist related deaths that year, while the remaining ninety-eight 
percent involved far-right extremists.29   
In 2019, Congress recognized that “[w]hite supremacists and other 
far-right-wing extremists are the most significant domestic terrorism 
threat facing the United States.”30  Violence in the name of white 
supremacy is, however, not simply a domestic problem affecting only 
the U.S.; rather, far-right extremism is a transnational problem.31  
Attacks have occurred all over the world, from Norway to New 
Zealand, and Canada to the United Kingdom.32  The act of terrorism 
in Christchurch, New Zealand, discussed in Part I supra, and the 
 
24.  See id. at 28; Alexander Conley, Note, Obscene Terrorism: Can the First 
Amendment’s Obscenity Framework Be Applied to Terrorist Speech?, 51 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 345, 357 (2017). 
25.  SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 8–10.  
26.  Extreme Right / Radical Right / Far Right, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www. 
adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/extreme-right-radical-right-far-right [https://perma. 
cc/8ZKS-YZZ5] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020). 
27. See id. 
28.  SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 9–10. 
29.  See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, A REPORT FROM THE CENTER ON EXTREMISM: 
MURDER AND EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2018 13 (2019), https://www.adl 
.org/media/12480/download [https://perma.cc/23GP-QEC9].  Seventy-eight percent of 
all extremist related murders in 2018 were committed by individuals associated with 
white supremacist groups.  Id. 
30.  Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act, S. 894, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
31.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6, 11.  
32.  See id. at 31. 
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2011 attacks carried out by Anders Breivik in Oslo and Utoya 
Norway—with a total death count of sixty-nine—are believed to be 
among the most “high-profile” and influential far-right extremist 
attacks to date.33  These attacks, although taking place entirely 
outside of the U.S., have had a tremendous impact on the U.S., 
causing an influx of extremist violence in recent years.34  In the 
aftermath of the aforementioned acts of terrorism, lone actors across 
the country have taken their advocacy of white supremacy to another 
level, initiating a violent movement.35  Some examples include the 
mass shooting of parishioners at a church in Charleston, South 
Carolina, discussed infra Section III.B., the attack on members 
congregating at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, discussed infra Section III.B., and the shooting at a 
Walmart in El Paso, Texas, discussed supra Part I.36  These are only 
a small fraction of the domestic terrorist attacks that have plagued the 
U.S. following the 2011 terrorist attack in Norway.37 
B. Online Radicalization 
In his sixteen-thousand-word manifesto, Brenton Tarrant wrote: 
“From where did you receive/research/develop your beliefs? . . . The 
internet, of course. You will not find the truth anywhere else.”38  This 
statement breathes life into former FBI agent Ali Soufan’s statement 
that “social media has exacerbated the issue [of domestic terrorism] 
by helping connect transnational nodes of like-minded individuals 
and groups.”39  Social media has become a prominent avenue for 
violent far-right extremists to share their ideas, spread their causes, 
and radicalize others.40  White supremacists all over the world have 
taken notice of the unique internet laws in the U.S. and exploited its 
lenient policies to promote their extremist ideologies.41  An 
 
33.  Id. at 11, 26–27. 
34.  See id. at 41. 
35.  See id. 
36.  See id. at 8; see infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text; see infra notes 77–80 and 
accompanying text; see supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.  
37.  See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE , supra note 29, at 13.  
38.  Lizzie Dearden, New Zealand Attack: How Nonsensical White Genocide Conspiracy 
Theory Cited by Alleged Gunman Is Spreading Poison Around the World, 
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world 
/australasia/new-zealand-christchurch-mosque-attack-white-genocide-conspiracy-theo 
ry-a8824671.html [https://perma.cc/L32P-6ARM]. 
39.  SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 41. 
40.  Id. at 17. 
41.  See, e.g., Austin, supra note 11 (discussing 8chan as an example of a site that has 
taken advantage of the lax internet laws in the U.S.). 
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unmoderated online forum, 8chan, has been ground zero for white 
supremacist violence in recent years.42  Three terrorist attacks in 
2019 alone—the shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand, the Poway 
Synagogue shooting in California, and the El Paso shooting—have 
been linked to 8chan.43  The individuals responsible for each of these 
attacks posted lengthy manifestos to 8chan before committing these 
acts of violence.44  Anonymous users on the website not only 
celebrated the acts of violence but also spread the content across the 
Internet and promoted the attackers’ messages.45  The radicalization 
process comes full circle with the help of unmoderated websites such 
as 8chan.46  In his manifesto, posted to 8chan just nineteen minutes 
before the attack ensued, the El Paso shooter gave credit to the 
Christchurch shooter for inspiring him to take action.47  Within the 
confines of his manifesto, Crusius explored his white supremacist 
ideals and motivations, while also expressing the importance of 
publicity for the issue, stating: “[D]o your part and spread this 
brothers!”48  While the Poway shooter relied heavily on a similar 
website, Gab, to promote his cause and spread awareness of his 
hateful acts, he also posted on 8chan stating: “[W]hat I’ve learned 
here is priceless. It’s been an honor.”49  The increased use of social 
media to radicalize individuals in all corners of the world has created 
a decentralized threat which may be more difficult for the 
Government to detect and control.50 
 
42.  See Sean Keane & Oscar Gonzalez, 8chan’s Rebranded 8kun Site Goes Offline Days 
After Launch, CNET (Nov. 25, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/8chan-
rebranded-8kun-site-taken-offline-days-after-launch/ [https://perma.cc/48F7-9HSD].  
Following its temporary shutdown as a result of the El Paso shooting and its role in 
that violent attack, 8chan re-entered the online sphere on under a new name: 8kun.  Id.  
The website was subsequently shut down again two days later.  Id. 
43.  Harwell, supra note 12.  
44.  Id.; SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 18. 
45.  Harwell, supra note 12.  
46.  See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
47.  See Harwell, supra note 12; see Arango et al., supra note 6. 
48.  Harwell, supra note 12; see Austin, supra note 11. 
49.  See Keegan Hankes et al., Shooting at Poway Synagogue Underscores Link Between 
Internet Radicalization and Violence, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 28, 2019), https:// 
www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/04/28/shooting-poway-synagogue-underscores-li 
nk-between-internet-radicalization-and-violence [https://perma.cc/6LW8-43CH]; see 
also Harwell, supra note 12; see generally Kevin Roose, On Gab, an Extremist-
Friendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired His Hatred in Full, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-robert-bowers-pittsburgh-syn 
agogue-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/4A6F-QF9E]. 
50.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 35–36. 
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III. LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACTION 
A. Communications Decency Act 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) is one factor creating a 
substantial impediment to government action where online 
radicalization is concerned.51  The CDA was enacted as part of the 
Telecommunications Act in 1996 to limit publisher liability in light 
of the perceived differences between the Internet and other 
mediums.52  Section 230 of the CDA, perhaps the most important 
piece of internet legislation, states in relevant part: “No provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”53  This section shields computer 
service providers from liability when lawsuits arise out of content 
generated by users on the host’s website.54  The types of publishing 
activity intended to fall under this protection include “monitoring, 
reviewing, and editing content.”55  In Fields v. Twitter, the court 
refused a broad interpretation of Section 230, stating that, 
“[s]hielding interactive computer service providers from publisher 
liability for all content encourages these companies to create 
‘platform[s] . . . allow[ing] for the freedom of expression [of] 
hundreds of millions of people around the world,’ . . . just as the 
CDA intended.”56 
This legislation has been instrumental in expanding social media 
platforms and in making the Internet what it is today.57  While this 
section of the CDA has been credited for its role in the progression of 
the online world, it also has tremendous pitfalls.58  Under the CDA, 
 
51.  See Beale, supra note 14, at 338. 
52.  See Adi Robertson, Why the Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How People 
Are Still Getting It Wrong, VERGE (June 21, 2019, 1:02 PM), https://www.the 
verge.com/2019/6/21/18700605/section-230-internet-law-twenty-six-words-that-creat 
ed-the-internet-jeff-kosseff-interview [https://perma.cc/VMC5-7UNS]. 
53.  Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
54.  See Robertson, supra note 52.  
55.  Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 
739 (9th Cir. 2018). 
56.  Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).  
57.  See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/J8D3-DH6B] (last visited Dec. 
16, 2020) [hereinafter Section 230] (“This legal and policy framework has allowed for 
YouTube and Vimeo users to upload their own videos, Amazon and Yelp to offer 
countless user reviews, craigslist to host classified ads, and Facebook and Twitter to 
offer social networking to hundreds of millions of Internet users.”). 
58.  See id.; see Robertson, supra note 52. 
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Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are seldom held liable for 
inadequate or a complete lack of monitoring and editing 
mechanisms.59  ISPs are therefore not incentivized to create systems 
to monitor and prevent the spread of hateful or violent speech.60  
Although some of the largest social media platforms—e.g., Facebook 
and Twitter—took steps to prevent the spread of hateful and violent 
content, their measures have only driven extremists to underground, 
unmoderated platforms.61  As a result, online platforms such as 
8chan, 4chan, Gab, the Daily Stormer, and many others have become 
cesspools for violence and hatred, leaving it entirely in the hands of 
ISPs to put an end to underground communities of hate speech.62 
B. Domestic Terrorism Under Current Law 
Current federal law is also grossly inadequate to address the 
growing concerns surrounding violence by the extreme right.63  Title 
18 of the U.S. Code defines acts of domestic terrorism as:  
[A]ctivities that involve acts dangerous to human life that 
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of 
any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.64 
While domestic terrorism is explicitly defined under federal law, it is 
not a federal crime.65  Therefore, acts of violence that fall within the 
 
59.  See, e.g., Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1129; Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 
1356 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418⁠–⁠19 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1162⁠–⁠63 (9th Cir. 2008). 
60.  See Beale, supra note 14, at 344.  
61.  See Roose, supra note 49. 
62.  See Keller, supra note 15; see SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6. 
63.  See Barbara McQuade, Proposed Bills Would Help Combat Domestics Terrorism, 
LAWFARE (Aug. 20, 2019, 8:49 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposed-bills-
would-help-combat-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/B322-SJFW]. 
64.  18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). 
65.  Kevin Johnson & Kristine Phillips, After Massacres and Thwarted Plots, Federal 
Authorities Confront Limits in Fighting Domestic Terrorism, USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 
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statutory definition of domestic terrorism cannot be treated as federal 
crimes.66  Prosecutors across the country are instead tasked with 
employing various state and federal charges to prosecute those who 
commit acts of domestic terrorism.67  This has proven to be a 
challenge, often delivering unsatisfying results.68 
 In 2015, Dylann Roof committed one of the most notable acts of 
domestic terrorism in recent history.69  The twenty-one-year-old 
white supremacist killed nine African-American parishioners at a 
church in Charleston, South Carolina.70  Like many other white 
supremacist extremists, Roof posted a manifesto sharing his ideology 
and the reasoning behind his attack.71  In his proclamation, Roof 
“blamed blacks for ‘raping our women’ and taking over ‘our 
country.’”72  Roof’s manifesto and his decision to leave only one 
witness behind to testify to the events of that day are sufficient 
considerations to establish that his actions were dangerous to human 
life and “appear[ed] to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population.”73  Although his actions fell within the statutory 
definition of domestic terrorism, prosecutors were only able to charge 
Roof with federal hate crimes.74  This attack drew attention to the 
inadequate terrorism laws in place in the U.S. and emphasized the 
need for reconstruction.75   
 Despite the apparent need for reform, federal terrorism laws remain 
unchanged.76  On October 27, 2018, Robert Bowers entered the Tree 
of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania where he killed eleven 
 
66.  Trevor Aaronson, Terrorism’s Double Standard: Violent Far-Right Extremists Are 
Rarely Prosecuted as Terrorists, INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019, 8:34 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23/domestic-terrorism-fbi-prosecutions/ [https://per 
ma.cc/572L-MHPQ]. 
67.  Id.; see Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and 
“International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2019). 
68.  Aaronson, supra note 66. 
69.  See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 29, at 25 (listing Dylann Roof’s attack as 
one of the ten deadliest acts of violence by domestic extremists over the past six 
decades). 
70.  Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why It 
Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 260 (2017). 
71.  See id. at 274. 
72.  Id.  
73.  Id. (“Any murder motivated by a racist ideology is inherently intimidating to the hated 
population, and any attacker committing such murder clearly intends for that 
intimidation to occur.”); see 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).  
74.  See Norris, supra note 70, at 273. 
75.  See id. at 259. 
76.  See generally Aaronson, supra note 66. 
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members congregating for religious services.77  Bowers’s actions can 
be traced to an anti-Semitic ideology, as his social media postings 
reflect a hatred for practicing Jews.78  The attack on the Tree of Life 
Synagogue was presumably attributed to Bowers’s hatred of Jewish 
people, making his attack an act of domestic terrorism.79  Even 
though his actions rose to the level of terrorism, Bowers was only 
indicted on charges of murder, discharging a firearm, and federal hate 
crimes.80 
Individuals detained before committing an act of terrorism prove 
even more difficult to prosecute.81  For example, prosecutors 
grappled with the insufficient resources at their disposal when 
indicting Christopher Hasson on weapons and drug-related charges in 
early 2019.82  Hasson purchased “15 guns, silencers, [and] 1,000 
rounds of ammunition” in preparation for the attack the Government 
believes he planned to commit against prominent politicians and 
media journalists in the name of white supremacy.83  Despite 
recognizing Hasson as a domestic terrorist, the Government was 
unable to prosecute him as such due to the continued absence of 
legislation making domestic terrorism a federal crime.84  Government 
entities are better equipped to deal with foreign threats in this context 
because attempt, conspiracy, and material support statutes allow them 
to act before heinous crimes involving foreign terrorist organizations 
(FTOs) are actually committed.85  Similar provisions do not exist 
where domestic threats are concerned, making it difficult for 
 
77.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Additional Charges Filed in Tree of Life 
Synagogue Shooting (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/additional-cha 
rges-filed-tree-life-synagogue-shooting [https://perma.cc/MSP8-X4FC] [hereinafter 
Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting]. 
78.  Id. (“[A] statement on his profile expressed the belief that ‘[J]ews are the children of 
[S]atan.’”). 
79.  See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). 
80.  See Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting, supra note 77. 
81.  See, e.g., Motion for Detention Pending Trial at 1, United States v. Hasson, No. GLS-
19-63 (D. Md. Feb. 19, 2019). 
82.  Id.  In its Motion for Detention Pending Trial, the Government, claiming that Hasson 
is in fact a domestic terrorist, impliedly stated that it was grasping at straws to convict 
a terrorist for his attempted crimes.  Id.  
83.  Tom Jackman, Coast Guard Lieutenant Accused of Plotting Mass Attack Pleads 
Guilty to Gun, Drug Charges, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019, 4:01 PM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/coast-guard-lieutenant-accused-of-plott 
ing-mass-attack-pleads-guilty-to-gun-drug-charges/2019/10/03/58c0fbf8-e553-11e9-
b403-f738899982d2_story.html [https://perma.cc/RN4Z-2Y5Y].  
84.  See Motion for Detention Pending Trial, supra note 81, at 1.  
85.  See McQuade, supra note 63; see 18 U.S.C. § 2332b; see also § 2339B(a)–(e). 
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authorities to intervene and prosecute individuals who have not yet 
carried out their intended crimes.86  
Due to the Government’s limited resources, the FBI has primarily 
relied on tips from the public in thwarting plots of domestic 
terrorism.87  In the months following the El Paso shooting, police 
detained a number of individuals reported by members of the public 
for expressing intentions to commit acts of mass violence.88  The 
public remaining vigilant and on high alert in the wake of a series of 
mass shootings prevented these individuals from carrying out what 
could have been horrific acts of domestic terrorism.89  In November 
of 2019, the Deputy Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism 
Division of the FBI spoke in Washington, D.C. about the FBI’s 
current counterterrorism strategies.90  During this lecture, he stated 
that “tips from the public will be one [of] the most powerful tools we 
have in detecting and preventing attacks.”91  This statement 
emphasizes  the lack of resources at the Government’s disposal in 
combatting domestic terrorism.92 
While the public was instrumental in thwarting a few individuals 
who may have potentially carried out acts of mass violence, this is 
not a sufficient long-term solution.93  For example, the public 
informed the FBI of a potential attack on the Poway Synagogue in 
California five minutes before the shooting occurred.94  This brief 
timespan did not offer officials enough time to identify the alleged 
shooter and take the proper course of action to detain him before the 
 
86.  See Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, S. 894, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(introducing agency infrastructure, reporting standards, and funding to address 
growing concern of domestic terrorism).  
87.  Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.  
88.  Id. (“A Florida man allegedly vows to ‘break a world record’ for mass shooting 
casualties; a disgruntled hotel cook in California threatens to transform a Marriott 
lobby into a killing field; a Jewish community center in Ohio is the target in a 
suspected shooting plot.”). 
89.  See id.  
90.  Matthew Alcoke, Deputy Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, Remarks at Washington Inst. for Near East Pol’y Counterterrorism 
Lecture Series: The Evolving and Persistent Terrorism Threat to the Homeland (Nov. 
19, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-evolving-and-persistent-terrorism-
threat-to-the-homeland-111919 [https://perma.cc/WVC4-X9ZH].  
91.  Id.  
92.  See id. 
93.  See Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65. 
94.  See Julia Reinstein, Someone Found the Poway Synagogue Shooter’s Manifesto and 
Called the FBI Minutes Before the Attack Began, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019, 
12:05 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/8chan-poway-synag 
ogue-shooter-manifesto-fbi [https://perma.cc/9Q6G-AH5K]. 
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attack came to fruition.95  If the past is any indication of what is to be 
expected in the future, the public will not have enough time to alert 
FBI officials to such attacks before they are carried out.96  Another 
concern involves the sheer number of tips received by officials.97  
FBI reports show that “[d]uring the first week of August, the period 
covering the El Paso and Dayton shootings . . . 38,000 tips had 
streamed into its National Threat Operations Center[.]”98   
IV. EXPANDING UNITED STATES TERRORISM LAWS 
A. Domestic Terrorism as a Federal Crime 
Following a number of domestic terrorist attacks that plagued the 
U.S. in 2018, a series of bills were introduced in both the House and 
Senate to address the rising concern of domestic terrorism.99  In 
March 2019, Senator Richard Durbin introduced the Domestic 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, the goal of which was to provide 
government entities with the necessary resources to fight domestic 
terrorism.100  This bill did not advocate immediate amendments to 
U.S. terrorism laws, but instead suggested that government entities, 
including the FBI and Department of Justice, receive authorization to 
investigate organizations perceived as domestic threats.101  In August 
2019, Democratic Representative Adam Schiff introduced another 
 
95.  See id. 
96.  See id.; see also Harwell, supra note 12 (discussing El Paso shooter’s manifesto 
posted to 8chan minutes before the attack began); see also Christchurch Shooting, 
supra note 1 (discussing Christchurch shooter’s livestream video posted moments 
before opening fire). 
97.  See Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.  
98.  Id.  
99.  See generally ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 29, at 10, 13–15, 23–24 (“[I]n 
2018, there were five shooting sprees collectively responsible for 38 deaths and 33 
non-fatal casualties.”); see also Press Release, Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman, House 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., Schiff Introduces Legislation to Create a Federal 
Domestic Terrorism Crime (Aug. 16, 2019), https://schiff.house.gov/news/press-
releases/schiff-introduces-legislation-to-create-a-federal-domestic-terrorism-crime 
[https://perma.cc/EY8A-U4XR]. 
100.  See Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, S. 894, 116th Cong. (2019) (the Act 
is designed “[t]o authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the 
Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.”).  
101.  Id. at §§ 4(a)(2)–(3), 6(a), 7–8. 
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bill titled Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act.102  This 
bill proposed a much-needed amendment to Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code, which, if implemented, would make domestic terrorism a 
federal crime.103  As discussed, domestic terrorism is already defined 
under Title 18 of the U.S. Code and largely mirrors the statutory 
definition of international terrorism.104  However, one significant 
difference is that international terrorism is a federal crime under 
Section 2332b, while no analogous provision currently exists 
recognizing domestic terrorism as a federal crime.105 
The bill introduced by Representative Schiff also proposed an 
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which would make it a federal 
crime to provide material support or resources in furtherance of an 
act of domestic terrorism.106  “Material support” in this context 
includes: 
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or 
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.107 
Under current federal law, this provision can only be used to 
prosecute individuals suspected of providing material support to 
 
102.  Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act, H.R. 4192, 116th Cong. § 1 
(2019); see McQuade, supra note 63.  A strikingly similar bill was introduced by 
Republican Senator Martha McSally.  McQuade, supra note 63. 
103.  Compare H.R. 4192 (proposing the inclusion of “Acts of Terrorism Occurring in the 
Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States” under § 2332 of the U.S.C.), with 18 
U.S.C. § 2332b (limiting criminal penalties for terrorist acts to crimes affecting 
commerce, crimes committed against the U.S. Government, and crimes committed in 
U.S. waters). 
104.  See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).  The 
only notable difference between the statutory definitions is that acts of domestic 
terrorism must “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” 
while international terrorism must “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States[.]”  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (defining international 
terrorism) (emphasis added), with § 2331(5) (defining domestic terrorism) (emphasis 
added). 
105.  See Johnson & Phillips, supra note 65.  
106.  See H.R. 4192 § 2.   
107.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).  
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international terrorists.108  However, the Government predominantly 
relies on Section 2339B in cases involving international terrorism.109  
Both provisions proscribe anyone from providing material support or 
resources: Section 2339A prohibits providing such support to aid acts 
of terrorism,110 while Section 2339B prohibits the same conduct in 
support of FTOs.111  Creating an analogous provision under Section 
2339B to prohibit individuals from providing material support to 
domestic terrorist organizations (DTOs) is not feasible under current 
law, as the Government has yet to compile and make publicly 
available a list of organizations classified as domestic threats.112  In 
relying on Section 2339A to prevent material support in cases 
involving domestic terrorism, Representative Schiff attempts to 
remedy the gap in legislation without the need for a designated DTO 
list.113 
B. Addressing the Concerns 
The amendment to Section 2339A114 is a primary aspect of 
Representative Schiff’s proposed bill and suggested changes to 
terrorism legislation in general, which has received significant 
criticism.115  One explanation for this reaction is the perceived 
overuse and abuse of Section 2339B, which has been used to secure 
convictions of U.S. citizens allegedly involved in furthering the 
objectives of FTOs.116  The material support provisions have been 
 
108.  Compare H.R. 4192 § 2 (proposing the inclusion of “[a]cts of terrorism occurring in 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” under § 2339A(a)), with 18 U.S.C. § 
2339A(a). 
109.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
110.  § 2339A. 
111.  § 2339B. 
112.  See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN 
OVERVIEW 57–58 (2017). 
113.  See H.R. 4192 § 2. 
114.  See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.  
115.  Matt Ford, The Danger of a Domestic Terrorism Law, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 
2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154785/danger-domestic-terrorism-law [https: 
//perma.cc/Q69F-BZUZ]. 
116.  See id.; see also Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1355–56.  Tarek Mahanna’s case provides 
an example.  Ford, supra note 115. 
 
Federal prosecutors brought material-support charges against 
the Pennsylvania-born man in 2009 for providing assistance to Al 
Qaeda.  That assistance, according to prosecutors, came in the 
form of translating publicly available Al Qaeda documents into 




350 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
subject to scrutiny because such laws encroach on constitutionally 
protected rights¾particularly the right to free speech and 
association.117  First Amendment concerns drive the immense 
reservation in amending terrorism statutes to criminalize acts of 
domestic terrorism.118  For example, the overreaching effects of 
material support statutes in cases involving international terrorism 
raise concerns that, if applied to domestic terrorism, constitutionally 
protected conduct (e.g., sharing online memes posted by white 
supremacist groups, forwarding manifestos, or linking and sharing 
copies of books inspiring such organizations) will subject U.S. 
citizens to severe criminal penalties.119  Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project is a frequently cited case exemplifying the overreaching 
effects of the material support provisions.120  In that case, domestic 
organizations and U.S. citizens challenged Section 2339B, claiming 
that the material support provision—which prohibited the 
organizations from providing lawful assistance to designated FTOs—
violated their constitutional right to free speech and association.121  
The objective of these individuals and organizations was to provide 
lawful support to the humanitarian and political sectors of two FTOs, 
not to support the organizations’ terrorist activities.122  The Supreme 
Court held that Section 2339B is to be interpreted as prohibiting U.S. 
citizens from providing material support or resources to organizations 
when the person or group providing such support knows the 
organization is a designated FTO or has connections to terrorism; it 
did not, however, choose to extend the mens rea requirement to the 
intent behind providing material support to FTOs.123  Therefore, the 
individuals and organization challenging the constitutionality of 
Section 2339B were prohibited from providing any kind of material 
support or resources to the FTOs, despite the fact that their intentions 
 
   While Mahanna expressed verbal support for Osama bin 
Laden’s cause at times, the ACLU noted in 2012 that prosecutors 
offered no evidence that he was in communication with Al Qaeda 
or acted at the organization’s behest.  His conviction rested on the 




117.  See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1367–68; see also Ford, supra note 115.   
118.  See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1367.  
119.  See Ford, supra note 115.  
120.  See generally 561 U.S. 1 (2010); see Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1368. 
121.  Holder, 561 U.S. at 7–8. 
122.  Id. at 10.  
123.  See id. at 16–17.  
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were not to further the unlawful objectives of the organizations.124  
The Court recognized that the conduct in question involved speech, 
but clarified that speech is not protected in all instances, specifically 
in the context of terrorism.125  
In upholding the constitutionality of Section 2339B, even when 
free speech is limited by government action, the Supreme Court held 
that material support “frees up other resources within the 
organization that may be put to violent ends[,] . . . [and] lend[s] 
legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier 
for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—
all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”126  Although this 
rationale was applied in the context of international terrorism, the 
same concerns can and should be echoed when support is given to 
domestic organizations.127  The Court also referenced diplomacy 
reasons for allowing Section 2339B to prohibit otherwise protected 
speech.128  By allowing U.S. citizens to provide support to FTOs that 
other countries are vigorously fighting to dismantle, the U.S. would 
impair its relationships with those countries.129  This concern is 
overlooked in terms of domestic terrorism because domestic 
organizations are perceived as being a threat only to the U.S.;130 
however, white supremacist groups—the primary domestic threat—
operate in various cells in countries all over the world and therefore 
present an equally applicable reason for extending material support 
provisions in cases of domestic terrorism.131  A few countries, such 
as Canada and the United Kingdom, have already taken steps to 
combat terrorism linked to white supremacist ideologies.132  If the 
U.S. continues to allow material support to be given freely to these 
organizations, it could eventually be perceived as hindering the 
efforts taken by other countries.133  This is especially true considering 
Section 230 of the CDA provides terrorists worldwide access to 
platforms which enable these organizations to spread their message, 
 
124.  See id. at 14–17. 
125.  See id. at 27–29. 
126.  Id. at 30. 
127.  Cf. Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1333, 1336–37, 1371 (discussing how domestic terrorist 
threats are handled differently by the Government and law enforcement as compared 
to international terrorist threats, even though domestic terrorism poses a more direct 
threat to Americans). 
128.  Holder, 561 U.S. at 32. 
129.  Id. at 32–33.  
130.  See Sinnar, supra note 67, at 1371. 
131.  See supra Section II.A. 
132.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 12.  
133.  See id. 
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radicalize, and mobilize.134  Having upheld legislation that allows the 
threat of terrorism to evolve and grow, the U.S. must begin taking 
steps to combat the spread of white supremacist violence.135   
Amending Title 18 to include a material support charge applicable 
to those acting in furtherance of domestic terrorism will not only 
address the diplomacy concerns, but will also be instrumental in 
detecting and preventing the largest domestic threat confronting the 
U.S. government: the lone wolf actor.136  Each of the domestic 
terrorist attacks described thus far was carried out by individuals 
characterized as lone wolf actors.137  “[T]errorist lone actors (lone 
wolves) . . . generally operate autonomously and in secret, all the 
while drawing ideological sustenance—not direction—from 
propagandists operating in the free market of ideas.”138  Lone actors 
have proven to be a great challenge for law enforcement as they lack 
official membership in or in connection with specific 
organizations.139  Another reason for this challenge is that under the 
current federal structure, “[u]p until the moment the trigger is pulled, 
the quintessential, and typical, lone wolf will not have violated any 
laws.”140  This gap in legislation is precisely why prominent white 
supremacist leaders have promoted leaderless resistance over the 
years.141  Not only are lone actors often able to go undetected, but 
 
134.  See Section 230, supra note 57 (“The legal protections provided by CDA 230 are 
unique to U.S. law[] . . . [which] makes the U.S. a safe haven for websites that want to 
provide a platform for controversial or political speech and a legal environment 
favorable to free expression.”). 
135.  See infra text accompanying notes 161–66. 
136.  See generally Terrorism, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism [https:// 
perma.cc/2UL7-XZ7M] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020). 
137.  See supra Sections II.A., III.B. 
138.  BJELOPERA, supra note 112, at 2. 
139.  See Terrorism, supra note 136. 
140.  Beau D. Barnes, Note, Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law 
Enforcement and Prosecution Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 1613, 1654 (2012). 
141.  Jared Keller, There Are No Lone Wolves, PAC. STANDARD (May 22, 2018), https:// 
psmag.com/news/there-are-no-lone-wolves [https://perma.cc/2EQU-U9UL].  “After 
several high-profile crimes committed by organized white supremacist groups during 
the ‘70s and ‘80s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had started getting tough on 
‘coordinated forms of militancy,’ . . .  Decentralized ‘lone wolves’ allowed white 
supremacists to to [sic] thwart conspiracy statutes. And it worked.”  Id.  “When 
hundreds of ‘lone wolves’ are reading the same websites, talking to each other, 
consuming the same stories, picking up easily accessible weapons, and killing the 
same targets, they have become a pack.”  Id.  (quoting David M. Perry, How White 
American Terrorists Are Radicalized, PAC. STANDARD (Mar. 26, 2018), https://ps 
mag.com/social-justice/how-white-american-terrorists-are-radicalized). 
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once reprimanded, the organization as a whole is not negatively 
impacted.142 
Although the threat of white supremacy is one that should be 
approached with as much vigor and force as that which is used in the 
war against international terrorism, it must be handled in the least 
restrictive way possible.143  This requires a balancing of civil liberties 
and national security to determine what lengths must be taken in 
order to effectively combat domestic terrorism.144  If implemented 
correctly, an amendment to Section 2339A would allow government 
entities to thwart acts of violence before they occur, and would give 
prosecutors the ability to charge those involved in terrorist conduct to 
the fullest extent while still limiting the suppression of free speech.145 
Justice Breyer addressed this issue in his dissenting opinion in 
Holder.146  Justice Breyer stated that it is entirely possible to prevent 
the criminalization of constitutionally protected speech under Section 
2339B.147  This simply calls for an interpretation which would attach 
the mens rea requirement to all subsequent elements of the statute, a 
customary practice for interpreting criminal statutes.148  The statute 
prohibits U.S. citizens from “knowingly provid[ing] material support 
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”149  By requiring 
those providing material support to not only have knowledge that the 
organization is an FTO, as the majority suggested, but also to have 
knowledge that the material support would further the unlawful 
objectives of the organization or have a strong likelihood of doing so, 
Justice Breyer believed First Amendment concerns would be 
limited.150  This interpretation of the material support statute provides 
that criminal liability for constitutionally protected speech will attach 
only when the individual intends such speech to further the unlawful 
objectives of a designated terrorist organization, or when the 
individual knows there is a strong possibility that it will have that 
effect.151  This, in Justice Breyer’s opinion, would prevent 
 
142.  See id.  
143.  See Kenneth Lasson, Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the Limits of Free Speech 
and Religious Liberty, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 72–73 (2005) (“Individual liberty 
should be protected to the greatest extent possible, but not at the sacrifice of national 
security.”).  
144.  See id.  
145.  See McQuade, supra note 63; see also infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
146.  See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 41 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
147.  Id. at 56. 
148.  See id. at 57. 
149.  Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
150.  Holder, 561 U.S. at 53. 
151.  Id. at 56–57.  
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constitutionally protected speech from being criminalized.152  By 
adopting this interpretation, or rather, by amending Sections 2339A 
and 2339B to reflect this interpretation, the Government may be able 
to address the public’s concerns and prevent an overreaching 
encroachment on lawful, protected speech.153 
V. CONCLUSION  
Domestic terrorism has become one of the largest threats facing the 
U.S., even surpassing that of foreign terrorism.154  The U.S. is not 
equipped to deal with the evolving threat of terrorism, which is 
evidenced by the series of domestic attacks in previous years by 
individuals whose acts were driven by white supremacist 
ideologies.155  Under current U.S. law, domestic terrorism is not a 
federally recognized crime, and no system exists for designating 
white supremacist and other extremist groups as DTOs.156  This 
significantly limits the Government’s ability to locate and investigate 
individuals who may be planning to commit acts of terrorism against 
other U.S. citizens.157  The increase in domestic terrorist attacks in 
recent years has yet to inspire a significant change in federal law.158  
As such, the FBI continues to rely on tips from the public in 
identifying possible terrorist threats.159  Weeding out lone actors one 
at a time in the hopes of preventing further acts of terrorism displays 
a gross underestimation of the severity of the problem.160 
White supremacy extremism is a transnational problem,161 which is 
exacerbated by U.S. internet legislation allowing extremist groups to 
stay connected and recruit individuals from all corners of the world 
to join in and sympathize with their cause.162  Lax policies 
concerning domestic terrorism not only underestimates the risk to 
U.S. citizens but also hinder other countries that have taken steps to 
 
152.  See id. (“Where the activity fits into these categories of purposefully or knowingly 
supporting terrorist ends, the act of providing material support to a known terrorist 
organization bears a close enough relation to terrorist acts that, in my view, it likely 
can be prohibited notwithstanding any First Amendment interest.”).   
153.  See id. 
154.  See supra Section II.A. 
155.  See supra Section III.B. 
156.  See BJELOPERA, supra note 112, at 5–6. 
157.  See supra Section III.B. 
158.  See supra text accompanying notes 69–80. 
159.  See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.  
160.  See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
161.  See supra Section II.B. 
162.  See Section 230, supra note 57. 
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mitigate the problem of white supremacy extremism.163  Moving 
forward, U.S. terrorism laws need to be reformed to reflect the 
growing problem of domestic terrorism facing the U.S.164  These 
reforms include, first and foremost, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2332b to 
include acts of terrorism occurring within the U.S.165  Additionally, 
legislators need to address the First Amendment concerns 
surrounding the existing material support statutes and amend Section 
2339A to prohibit U.S. citizens from providing material support or 
resources in furtherance of acts of domestic terrorism.166  While 
legislators must take precautions to limit the encroachment on First 
Amendment rights, a degree of restriction on the right to free speech 
may be necessary to address the Government’s equally important 
interest in providing national security.167  U.S. terrorism law needs to 
be restructured to address the evolving threat of terrorism if there is 
any hope of suppressing the growing threat of domestic terrorism 























163.  See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.  
164.  See supra Section III.B. 
165.  See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.  
166.  See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text.  
167.  See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text. 
168.  See SOUFAN CTR., supra note 2, at 6–7.  
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